NVA!

Non Violent Action - The Theory

by Graham Himmelhoch-Mutton

What is NVA?

Non violent action is essentially a recognition that true power lies with the people, and that such power can only be fruitful through non violent means. There are three basic means by which we can bring about social change using NVA:

Protest and persuasion

Non cooperation

Non-violent intervention

Protest and persuasion includes obvious things such as street marches, demonstrations, pickets, rallies, petitions and direct lobbying of politicians and other power brokers by individuals or groups. These have varying degrees of success, but actions such as street marches can have a powerful effect, especially if not officially approved.

Non cooperation includes strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience. Hunger strikes would also come under this category. Other acts of non-cooperation could include withholding of funds (such as payment of taxes or fines) or the refusal to follow due procedures. A great example of this occurred when the majority of voters in the Flinders by-election scribbled "No Dams" on their ballot papers, thus rendering them invalid, but also delivering a powerful message to the government of the day.

Non-violent intervention is the attempted interference by a group of protesters in the actions or proceedings of the people or organisation they are protesting against. This cantake the form of sit-ins, occupations or obstruction of property or thoroughfares. This method tends to bring about a more rapid resolution of a dispute than either of the first two categories, but is also usually the "last resort" form of protest. During the Franklin River Blockade, this took the form of direct blockades of the dam works and of the river and road approaches to the sites.

Why NVA works

Utilising these three methods of action bring about change in two different ways. In the first place, they enable a group of protesters to gain support from a wider group and thus achieve greater impact. Secondly, the non-violent nature of the protest enables us to gain valuable support from among our opponents and those undecided about the cause. The use of violence in any form quickly degenerates the campaign into one of law and order, and public sympathy rapidly dissipates. It also gives the authorities some justification in using violence in return.

How NVA works

NVA reaches its objective in three main ways:

Conversion

Accomodation

Non-violent coercion

Conversion is the Utopian extreme whereby the opponent has a complete change of heart and agrees with all our goals and objectives. This is (not suprisingly) rare.

Non-violent coercion is at the other exterme, where the protest action has brought about a complete inability on the part of the adversary to attain their goals due to the NVA tactics employed by the protest group. Usually an intermediary (e.g. the government or a court ruling) brings about these successes.

Accomodation is the process of compromise, whereby one or both sides partially concede to the other side's demands. This normally happens not because of a change of belief, but because a partial concession seems to be better than any other alternative.

Which mechanism is most likely to succeed depends on the circumstances of each case. Where there appears no possibility of conversion, then non-violent coercion may be the only possibility. Normally however the choice is never that simple, and the stategies and tactics employed by a protest action will take into account all three of these mechanisms. We will now consider each of these in more detail:

CONVERSION

The idea of conversion must never be confused with that of subordination or dominance. For conversion to have any possibility of success, the goal of conversion must be to free not only the protest group, but the opponent as well. To free an opponent from their own misguided beliefs, systems and/or policies must be one of the goals of the protesting group, and they must make it cery clear that no personal hostility is intended towards the opponent, no matter how serious the (non-violent) protest action becomes.

Leaders of an opponent group are always unlikely to be successful conversion targets, however their underlings and supernumary supporters may well be influenced by protest action. For this reason it is important to maintain constant dialogue with the opponents, and the use of non-violent protest is a major factor in enabling communication throughout the life cycle of a protest. The combination of non-violence and the willingness to communicate goes a long way toward fostering respect which is a key element in the success of the conversion mechnism.

External factors influencing conversion

Conflict of interest.: If the opponent has a lot at stake, it will be more difficult to convert them than if they had relatively little interest in the issue. In the Franklin River Blockade for example, the developers with large contracts in the dam construction were never going to be influenced to change their minds. On the other hand, the police who were sent to arrest the protesters were far more likely to come around to our way of thinking.
Social status.: Similarly, if the opponents have a very low opinion of the protest group, then conversion is unlikely. In the Franklin River Blockade, people who thought conservationists were fit only for use as compost were clearly never going to compromise their beliefs.
Personality.: Clearly some people will be more readily susceptible to conversion than others. The personality types need to be considered if conversion is to be the chosen method.
Shared beliefs/practices.: If the opponents and the protesters share some beliefs or norms, there is more liklihood of conversion. For example, if both sides believe in democracy and freedom, then the chances for conversion are much greater than if the opponents are totalitarian by nature.
Third parties.: Opponents more likely to be influenced by the thoughts of third parties are again, more susceptible to conversion. For example, if the opponent is an official elected by the public, they are more susceptible to the viewpoints of their constituents than say the board of a private company. This can be a vitally important factor in the success of conversion.

Intenal factors influencing conversion

Violence & hostility.: Protest groups must emphasise the importance of restraining from physical violence and for maintaining respect for the opponent.
Gaining trust.: Trust must be cultivated in order to increase the chances of conversion. This is done chiefly through honesty (all statements made by the protest group must be scrupulously truthful) and openness of intent. Trust is difficult to build and easy to destroy. The importance of openness and honesty therefore cannot be emphasised enough.
Humiliation.: Opponents will hesitate to convert if they lose face in doing so. There needs to be a concerted effort to ensure the opponent is never humiliated or made to look like a "loser".
Sacrifices.: Mahatma Ghandi very clearly demonstrated that self-sacrifice and suffering has a significant impact on the opponent's conversion. If the protest group is clearly willing to sacrifice comfort, liberty, money and freedom for their cause, it may be enough to make an opponent think twice about their own beliefs.
Being constructive.: Opponents may move from a dogmatic position if workable altneratives are pointed out to them. It is always beneficial to work from a constructive, rather than a beligerant, or destructive point of view.
Contact.: It is imperative to maintain regular personal contact with the opponent.
Empathy.: A strong feeling of empathy with the opponent will enhance the prospects for conversion. Understanding the motives of the opposition, as well as considering the impact of the protest on them generates empathy and opens the door for communication and possible conversion.

ACCOMODATION

This is the "half-way" method, between the two extremes of coercion and conversion. The idea is to have the opponent agree to the demands of the protest group without necessarily having to change their attitude toward the action. This can only come about where the non-violent protest has successfully swung public sentiment in favour of the protest group, and where the opponent can see little option but to accede to their demands.

Many other factors can influence an opponent to give in to the protest group. Increased support from within the opponent's camp for the protest action, as well as from third parties is likely where the campaign has successfully utilised non-violent protest. Financial loss caused by a prolonged campaign is another significant factor, as is the consideration of future action. If, for example, the power brokers who allowed the flooding of Lake Pedder in the early 1970s had foreseen the uprising of the conservation movement caused by Lake Pedder, they may well have backed down on the Pedder question.

NON-VIOLENT COERCION

Where conversion and accomodation fail to sway an opponent, the demands of the protest group can still be achieved against the will of the opposition. Non-violent coercion achieves success in three ways:

Widespread and massive defiance which makes it impossible for the repressor's control over the situation to function successfully.
Widespread defiance also ensures the opponent's political, social, economic and/or industrial systems fall apart.
The opponent's ability to apply repression under such circumstances can dissolve completely, rendering them powerless.

The Franklin River blockade demonstrated this through the use of mass arrests, which quickly overloaded the state's prison systems, forcing authorities to release protesters straight back on to the streets, making the whole arrest process pointless.

General strikes are another succecssful form of mass non-violent protest which succeeds by undermining the usual processes and bringing repressive systems to a halt.

Political processes are reliant on complex interaction between many different sources of power for their over-arching control. The Tasmanian government during the Franklin River dispute discovered this when their reliance on the police, the legal and prisons system, the media and their own bureacratic processes was sorely tested. The police had little enthusiasm for their task; the prison system was quickly overloaded; the legal system failed to adequately cope with the flood of activity, and the government itself suffered from internal division. In that environment, their power base became very fragile, and ultimately the weight of public opinion forced the federal government to move in support of the protesters.

It can be seen however, that for non-violent coercion to work, large supporter bases are required, because only then does the opponent find it difficult to control the situation. One bushfire can be brought under control, but a wide-ranging wild fire with many fronts is a far more difficult prospect.

The application of non-violent coercion is not to be taken lightly, as it requires a great deal of dedication from the protest group. Stategies, tactics, ideals and a thorough understanding of the processes involved are required. When under pressure, each protester must be able to apply the proper processes in an instant, as a successful outcome may depend on the protesters acting independently (due to the lack of time for discussion!) and yet in unison. To do this skillfully requires training and committment, but will yield results as opponent's weaknesses in dealing with NVA protests can be quickly taken advantage of.

SUMMARY

As can be seen, NVA is an effective tool but requires planning, and can only ever be one tool in the protester's arsenal. Strategies need to be employed which take into account the many and varied factors that influence any protest action. Every protest action will have several unique factors, and therefore there can be no single set of guidelines that will always work in every situation. Planning and training are paramount, and this will the subject of another FRB special section in the near future.